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-------•GROUP BARGAINING POWER IN AGRICULTURE 
The confusion of repeatedly changing govern-
ment programs for agriculture and the persistent sur-
pluses of many farm commodities has led many farm-
ers to search for a fresh approach to the agricultural 
problem. The agricultural problem is not an easy 
thing to define, partly because it has a different ap-
pearance from the point of view of the individual 
farmer than it does from the point of view of the en-
tire industry. 
THE AGRICULTURAL PROBLEM 
-FROM TWO POINTS OF VIEW 
Taken collectively the problem in agriculture stems 
from a technological revolution. New agricultural 
machinery, insecticides, fertilizers, feed additives, and 
new varieties are some of the areas where technologi-
cal improvements have enabled agriculture to increase 
production faster than the demand for farm products 
has increased. This has resulted in a downward pres-
sure on prices and created forces for industry-wide 
adjustments in the use of land, labor, and capital. 
Actually the nation's food and fibre needs could 
be produced more efficiently today if the quantities 
of all resources used in agriculture were reduced. The 
usual process, however, has been for capital ( equip-
ment, fertilizer, weed-killers) to substitute for labor 
and land, thus increasing the pressure to move large 
quantities of these two resources out of agriculture. 
Much labor, though not enough, has left the farm, 
and government programs have diverted some land 
from agricultural production. But agricultural income 
today still has to be divided among too many resources 
for per capita income in the industry to be comparable 
to other industries. Income per acre of land, per unit 
of labor, or capital, in agriculture will remain low as 
long as more of each resource is employed in the in-
dustry than is needed to supply the nation's food and 
fiber needs, including exports. 
This is the aggregate or national problem. But 
each farmer sees his individual problem as one of low 
prices for what he sells and high prices for what he 
buys. From his point of view this price-squeeze seems 
to be the agricultural problem. The reason for this 
price-squeeze appears to him to be his lack of bargain-
ing power-he accepts the prices quoted to him be-
cause he individually has no power to influence them. 
Although an increase in prices received would 
seem to be a solution to the individual's income prob-
lem, it is not necessarily a solution when applied to 
the aggregate or industry-wide income problem. 
When applied to all producers, a price increase may 
actually decrease the individual farmer's income due 
to the resulting decrease in demand. Thus any solu-
tion which does not include industry-wide resource 
adjustments is not likely to be successful. 
THE FARMER FACES BIGNESS 
IN BUYERS AND SUPPLIERS 
Agriculture is often pointed to as an example of 
nearly perfect competition-many producers selling 
the same product with no one producer large enough 
to have power to influence price through his decisions 
to 5ell or not to sell. The seller under these conditions 
has no bargaining power. The other extreme from 
perfect competition is monopoly where there is only 
one seller. The monopolist is presumed to be in a posi-
tion to set any prices he wishes on his products-at 
least it sometimes appears this way. Actually com-
plete monopolies seldom, if ever, exist. Firms able to 
influence price must be in a position to limit output 
to the amount that buyers will take at that price. 
The farmer sees the bigness of the firms buying 
his product as well as those he buys from and this re-
inforces his feeling of individual helplessness without 
an organization bargaining for him in the market 
place. Many farmers, therefore, see the solution to 
their problem in the establishment of organizations 
which will give them increased bargaining power. 
IS BARGAINING POWER THE SOLUTION? 
This fact sheet is aimed at evaluating bargaining 
power as a solution to the agricultural problem. As 
pointed out earlier, the problem looks somewhat dif-
ferent from the aggregate or over-all industry point of 
view than it does from the individual's point of view. 
If farm problems are to be solved through group 
action, then it is necessary to attack the aggregate 
problem-in other words to bring about the total ad-
justment required in agriculture, including the elimi-
nation of surplus resources from the industry. Any 
attack on only one phase of the problem, such as price, 
cannot have more than temporary success by itself and 
may in fact create other more serious problems. 
DEFINITION OF BARGAINING POWER 
What is bargaining power? Bargaining is the proc-
ess of buyers and sellers attempting to get together 
to determine a "price" for the exchange of goods or 
services. If either the buyer or seller possesses any ad-
vantage in the bargaining process due to size, control 
of supplies or outlets, or any special knowledge of the 
market, that advantage is termed "bargaining power." 
Presumably the one possesssing such power can influ-
ence the price. In a perfectly competitive situation 
neither party individually is able to influence the price. 
Imperfect competition, which gives rise to bar-
gaining power, usually depends on restricted entry 
into the jndustry and reducing or controlling the 
number of competitors and the output of each. Bar-
gaining power also rests on the knowledge which 
each party possesses of the strength of the other party 
and of the competitors of each, as well as knowledge 
of the complete supply and demand situation. 
THE GOVERNMENT AND BARGAINING POWER 
Fundamentally, bargaining power also must de-
pend either on permissive or direct action of govern-
ment. Government either directly grants or indirectly 
permits bargaining power to be acquired by a private 
business. It grants and regulates franchises, establishes 
tariffs on international trade, and controls or prohibits 
certain kinds of monopoly. 
There is a legal basis for cooperative bargaining on 
the part of farmers that dates back to the Clayton Act 
(1914) which exempted farmer cooperatives in some 
circumstances from antitrust laws. The Capper-Vol-
stead Act in 1922 gave cooperative bargaining by 
farmers additional legal status. It would, however, 
be unwise to assume that these laws will permit pro-
ducer bargaining groups to go to extremes in the ex-
ercise of their power. 
Some very large firms probably possess far more 
bargaining power than they dare use due to fear of 
government action against them. We have had recent 
instances in which the price of steel was affected by 
government pressure. Nebraska has passed legislation 
limiting the power of agricultural bargaining groups. 
Consequently agriculture cannot proceed in its acqui-
sition and use of bargaining power without considera-
tion of the role of government and public opinion. 
ALTERNATIVES FOR IMPROVING 
BARGAINING POWER 
In addition to the legal status given cooperatives 
to increase bargaining power, broad government agri-
cultural programs such as we have had since the 
1930's also may enhance the bargaining position of 
farmers. This may be brought about through produc-
tion control programs, price supports, direct market 
purchases, acreage allotments, and market orders 
which affect supply and demand conditions of the 
market. An alternative outside the market may be 
that of direct payment to producers. 
The bargaining position of the individual farmer 
may be enhanced by becoming better informed re-
garding the operations of the marketing system. The 
scale and quality of his operations may be increased so 
as to increase the vaiue of products sold. Less room for 
discrimination may be achieved by working for better 
grading practices and standards, for improved market 
news services, and increased research information. 
COMPLEXITY OF BARGAINING POWER 
Bargaining power is not just a matter of numbers 
of economic resources. It is really quite a complex 
thing if one begins to analyze what it can and cannot 
do. For instance, consider the difference between 
labor bargaining for higher wages and a farm organ-
ization bargaining for a higher price for a certain 
commodity. The labor which a union has for sale is 
not something produced through the application of 
land, labor, and capital, but is possessed by one of these 
factors alone. If labor is unused it is totally lost. It 
cannot be stored and thus affect future bargaining. 
The labor union obtains its power from its ability to 
restrict the labor supply available to the employer. 
The firm, however, is usually left free to determine 
the number of workers it will hire at the agreed upon 
rate. 
A farm product does not automatically disappear 
when withheld from the market. The perishability of 
the product, its storability, the number of sellers, num-
ber of buyers, knowledge possessed by bargainers, 
laws permitting or regulating organized bargaining 
or withholding, the acceptability and availability of 
substitutes, and all the factors which determine the 
nature of the supply and the demand-these are the 
determinants of bargaining power. 
It should be clearly understood that a bargaining 
association is a purely voluntary organization. As 
such, nonmembers may gain as much or more than 
the members. If a regional bargaining association is 
unreasonable in its demands, it will cause production 
to shift to other higher-cost regions and thus benefit 
the new region more than the association members. 
HOW BARGAINING POWER IS USED 
Assuming that farmers are able through organiza-
tion to acquire bargaining power, how can it or should 
it be used? Possession of bargaining power is one 
thing; intelligent usage of it is another. Most people 
think of bargaining for a price or wage, but it can 
also be used for many other things. 
There could be bargaining for questions concern-
ing marketing procedures and specifications. What 
grading standards will be used and how will they be 
applied? How and when will the product be picked 
up from the farm? Who should speak for the indus-
try to others? Should advertising and market devel-
opment work, both domestic and foreign, be under-
taken, and how should it be paid for? Who will 
provide storage facilities? All of these and many other 
questions might be subjects for collective bargaining. 
SOURCES OF GAIN 
FROM USE OF BARGAINING POWER 
If bargaining power is to be successful, there must 
be increasing benefits or returns to the individual pro-
ducer as a result of group action. These gains must 
come from some source. Actually there are only three 
possible sources of gain which can be exploited by 
bargaining action. It is important that these be under-
stood, because there is no point in wasting bargaining 
power in an attempt to capture gains where no poten-
tial gains exist. 
The three sources of gain are: 
1. Gains from efficiencies in producing, marketing, 
and processing that can be achieved through group 
action. 
2. Gains from the "opponent" in the bargaining situa-
tion, usually a processor or marketing firm or an 
organization representing part or all of these firms. 
3. Gains from a third group, usually the consumer. 
Probably the greatest possibility for gain in most 
agricultural commodities is in number I-gains in 
efficiency. Producer organizations which have con-
centrated on better marketing techniques, control of 
product quality, cutting costs of handling and process-
ing, and product merchandising or promotion have 
usually succeeded in increasing the returns to their 
members. Producers too often have resisted using 
practices which would result in marketing and proc-
essing efficiencies. Extreme seasonality in milk pro-
duction is an example. 
If producers can agree to furnish a more uniform 
product and this results in greater efficiency in mar-
keting and processing, then they have created some-
thing that can be bargained for. Or if they furnish a 
product at a better time than previously and this re-
sults in greater marketing efficiency, this gain could 
go to the producers if their bargaining power is suffi-
cient and they have the ability to fulfill their agree-
ment. 
Unfortunately the other two sources of gain, (1) 
existing excess profits of the processors or marketing 
firms or (2) the consumer, appear to be easier sources 
to tap. The bargaining group often thinks it can either 
force the opponent to divide his "excess" profits or 
force him to raise the price of his product to the con-
sumer. This is the traditional theme of bargaining 
power. 
If the bargaining organization is bargaining with 
a single firm of an industry, this firm will not be able 
to recoup from a third party anything he gives up to 
to the bargaining group because of his competition. 
This is a difficult situation from which to extract any 
gain. The firm caught in this situation will energeti-
cally seek a new source of supply. 
If the producers can succeed in achieving industry-
wide bargaining, then it is usually not difficult to pass 
the cost of gains granted the producers on to the con-
sumer in the form of higher prices. The problem here 
is: how many producers will gain? Will consumption 
decline so much that many farmers will have to go 
out of production? The availability of substitutes for 
many food products makes this a real possibility. 
Labor unions in some cases have found that they have 
had to scale down their requests for wage increases in 
order to keep their employer in business and in a posi-
tion to continue their jobs. 
PRIORITIES IN BARGAINING PROCEDURE 
If there does happen to be a source of gain from 
the processors, or consumers, the first priority for a 
bargaining group to achieve this gain is strict control 
of the supply. If this cannot be achieved, then there is 
no point in proceeding any further. For products pro-
duced nation-wide, the control must be nation-wide, 
and tariffs will be necessary to protect gains from 
being lost to other countries. 
If strict control of supply is achieved, the second 
priority is to obtain as complete knowledge of the 
supply and demand situation as is possible. In most 
cases the opponents in bargaining will be large 
firms with very competent professional staffs keeping 
their management well informed. Producer bargain-
ing groups must be equally well informed if they are 
to be successful. In addition they must understand the 
role of price in our economy and the forces which 
determine price. 
· It is, for instance, misleading to compare the pric-
ing of ~gricultural commodities (raw materials) with 
consumer goods sold at retail. It is more logical to 
compare them with the pricing of minerals and other 
raw materials. The iron mining companies of Minne-
sota, for instance, cannot price their product at cost 
plus a reasonable profit and expect to sell much today. 
Steel companies have sources of iron ore which have 
lower costs than Minnesota and they are unwilling 
to pay a price which will make it possible for Minne-
sota mines to operate. If all iron mines were organized 
to raise the price of iron ore, then aluminum, plastic, 
and other substitutes would immediately come into 
the picture and the use of iron ore would decline. The 
agricultural situation is not far different from this. 
THE PRICING PROCESS 
IS EXCEEDINGLY COMPLEX 
The pricing of agricultural products such as corn, 
milk, wheat, and livestock is exceedingly complex. 
Each product has several uses, numerous by-products, 
and many substitutes, and different degrees of perish-
ability. Each of these factors has its own peculiar effect 
on pnce. 
Through technology we are able to devise substi-
tutes for almost any commodity. This is a very im-
portant factor in pricing and bargaining. Producers 
can always bargain for higher prices, but a higher 
price will not always result in a higher total revenue 
for the producers. The effect of a higher price for 
food products is determined partly by the availability 
of substitutes. Some dairy products, and especially 
butter, would probably suffer a considerable loss in 
sales through an increase in price, forcing total reve-
nue down. The reason would be the availability of 
substitutes. Other examples are silk, cotton, and wool 
and the synthetic fibres; lard and the vegetable oils; 
and steel and plastics. 
The effect of close substitutes for a product is to 
reduce the range within which bargaining power can 
be effectively used. Price becomes a less fruitful area 
for bargaining under these circumstances. Producers 
may have to look for means of becoming more· com-
petitive, possibly by lowering the cost of production. 
THE ROLE OF SUPPLY CONTROL IN PRICING 
Many of the nonagricultural industries today have 
a few large producers which dominate the industry. 
This gives them an advantage in pricing not enjoyed 
by agriculture. They can maintain fairly stable prices 
by regulating production. Price wars may occur in 
some of these industries if one of the major producers 
gets out of line or if a new firm is trying to secure a 
share of the market. But this system of stable prices 
works only because these firms can keep almost daily 
control over the volume of production. Strict regula-
tion of supply is a prerequisite to successfully admin-
istered prices. 
Agriculture has often looked with envy on the 
industry which can control its production and thus 
maintain stable prices. One attempt of agriculture to 
get at prices is through cooperatives. Actually farmers 
have been successful in many cases in getting through 
cooperatives better prices on the local level where lack 
of competition was permitting unfair price discrimi-
nation against them. But for the staple commodities 
of feed grains, wheat, and livestock products, pro-
ducers have never been able, consciously as a group, to 
affect the national market or price. In some areas and 
with some specialty crops, farmers have succeeded in 
getting control of the production of their commodities 
and thus have maintained a stable price. The experi-
ence with each commodity has been different and the 
degree of success has generally depended on the com-
pleteness of control and the availability of substitutes 
for the product. 
Agriculture undoubtedly can find ways to in-
crease its bargaining power. Farmers are most likely 
to be successful in this endeavor if they limit their 
immediate objectives to increasing the efficiency of 
the marketing and processing phases of their industry 
and leave the price bargaining until later. When they 
have achieved nearly complete control of the supply 
and acquired a professional staff that will provide as 
complete knowledge of supply and demand condi-
tions as their opponents have, then they will be in a 
position to consider bargaining for improved prices. 
